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WAR POWER'OF THE PRESIDENT—SUMMARY IMPRISONMENT—HABEAS CORPUS.
The Constitution of the United States establishes a government,
and not a confederacy or compact merely. This is obvious from the
facts that it institutes all the essentials of governmental power: a legis
lature, an executive, and a judiciary ; and that these powers are in
dependent of, and superior to, the ^veral state legislative, executive,
and judicial powers; so that we have an independent self-existent
government. It matters not that it is constitutionally limited in its
purposes, it is, within its constitutional sphere of action, as perfect a
sovereignty as any government on the face of the earth; for, “ this
constitution, and all laws of the United States, which shall be made
in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of
the land ; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any
thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary not
withstanding
and, “the judicial power shall extend to all cases in
law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their au
thority
and, “ the senators and representatives before-mentioned,
and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive
and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several
states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Consti
tution.”
We have, then, a National Government comprising a legislature,
invested with certain specified law-making powers; an' executive, to
see that the laws are faithfully executed; and a judiciary to maintain
all the legitimate powers of the government intact.
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And in its territorial jurisdiction, this government is co-extensive
with the thirty-four states of the Union, and all other territory there
unto belonging. And it was established in perpetuity; all its powers
w&xq given, granted, a,nd conveyed forever, save so far as they may, from
time to time, be amended in the way prescribed in the Constitution.
Constitutionally, then, this government is perpetual. It has a right
to live in the plenitude of its power, and the integrity of its territorial
sovereignty. And this right of life and perpetuity is necessarily a
primary and fundamental constitutional principle—paramount to
everything else. Every specific provision of the Constitution is as
obviously subordinate to it as if a clause to that effect were plainly
written down, for the continued life of the government is the indis
pensable basis upon which the entire Constitution rests.
Assuming, then, the controlling principle of the Constitution to be,
that the government and the Constitution itself shall live, it is selfevident, that this same controlling principle carries with it all the
ne.edful power to protect and defend the government in all its politi
cal and territorial sovereignty; so that there is somewhere in the gov
ernment a constitutional power to resist and suppress a rebellion,
limited only by the necessity of the case; power unlimited to use any
and all means necessary or expedient to suppress it; power to put
everything out of the way that in any manner, or in any degree, en
dangers tLe life of the government.
We say this principle flows naturally from the right of the govern
ment to live ; and we may go a step farther, and trace it to a still
deeper source in the constitutional fountain; to the constitutional
fact that we have a government. For without this principle, it can
not be said that the government has really a right to live; without it,
any portion of the people could destroy the government at will; and
without the right to live, what we have been in the habit of calling a
government, is really no government at all. If we have a rightful
government, that government has a right to live ; if it has a right to
live, it has a right to defend itself against rebellion ; and if it has a
right to defend itself, it has a right to use all needful means for that
purpose. If it has not the right thus to defend itself, the rebels have
the right to destroy it; for it cannot be wrong to destroy it, and also
wrong to defend it. I cannot comprehend the Buchanan doctrine,
that the rebels have not the right to destroy the government, and that
the government has not the right to resist them. It makes the Con
stitution a jumble. It makes it mean neither one thing nor the other,
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and puts sovereignty nowhere. Rejecting this mysterious doctrine,
therefore, we must admit, either the unlimited right of the govern
ment to defend itself, or the right of the South to break up the gov
ernment. There is no middle ground.
This brief deduction of constitutional principles, conclusive in itself
as it seems to be, is specifically endorsed and confirmed by this clause
of the Constitution:
u Before he enters on the execution of his office, he shall take the
following oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm),
that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United
States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and de
fend the Constitution of the United States.”
This clause commands the Constitution to be preserved, protected,
and defended, not conditionally, not in any particular manner, not by
any limited means, and not in subordination to the dicta of judges or
anybody else; but to the full extent of the President's ability. This
language sounds very much as if the first object of the Constitution is
to preserve and perpetuate itself. Paramount to everything else, it
shall be preserved, protected, and defended. Such is the palpable
import of the language. Now, to preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution, it is indispensable that this rebellion shall be suppressed;
so that this clause plainly and unequivocally requires and commands
that the rebellion shall be put down by any efficient and necessary
means whatever. And it constitutes and appoints the President the
chief agent of the nation to do this work. It swears him to do it
to the best of his ability, whiles it does not require any other man to
be so sworn. Other officers are sworn simply to support the Constitu
tion—he is sworn to preserve, protect, and defend it. To support the
Constitution is to uphold it by our ordinary influence and not oppose
it; to preserve, protect, and defend it to the best of one’s ability, is to
seek out its enemies who make war upon it, and their aids and com
forters, and put them down.
Constitutionally appointed commander-in chief, for this purpose,
too, the President is the embodiment of the unlimited national sover
eignty for the active work of preserving, protecting, and defending the
Constitution ; in other words, for suppressing rebellion. Whatever
the nation has a right to do in this behalf, he is the lawful agent to
do. with all the material means placed at his command by Con
gress. Therefore, the Constitution is imperative that he shall suppress
this rebellion by any and all needful measures, to the best of his
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ability. He is not only the commander-in-chief of the army in the
field and the navy on the waters, but the special conservator of the
Constitution in all respects, with jurisdiction co-extensive with the
whole Union. His power in this behalf reaches Maine and Minne
sota, as well as Virginia and Carolina.
Tell me now, ye croakers for “ the Constitution as it is,” why it
is that the President may lawfully shoot down our own citizens in
rebel armies, or imprison them, or destroy towns and cities and other
property, “ without due process of law,” in the face of the plain
constitutional provision, for which you clamor so long and so loudly,
that “ no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with
out due process of law. ” It is because the Constitution is not a self
destroying instrument; because no part of it was designed to aid
traitors in the unholy work of destroying the whole; because there is
nothing in it calculated to hinder or obstruct the work of maintain
ing it as the supreme law of the land; because that and all kindred
provisions are subordinate to the great fundamental principle of the
rjght of the government to live and defend itself against all perils;
because this principle obviously implies that every specific provision of
the Constitution shall be construed consistently with the amplest right
of the government to suppress rebellion by all needful means ; and be
cause the government, having the right to live, has the correlative
right to use sufficient means to preserve its own life, precisely as an
individual has the right to defend his life by any necessary means,
even to taking the life of an assailant.
If all this be sound constitutional law, it follows, necessarily, that,
in the execution of the great trust that is upon him, with the solemn
oath upon his soul, that he will preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution to the best of his ability, the President not only has a
Constitutional right, but it is his inexorable duty to suppress by suffi
ciently summary means, anything and everything, anywhere and
everywhere, within the Union, which, directly or indirectly, adds
strength to the rebellion. Tell me not that there is no rebellion in
the loyal states. If any man in Pennsylvania or Massachusetts is
guilty of any act which tends to aid the rebel arms, or to obstruct or
impede the President in his work of crushing out the rebellion, that
man is a part and parcel of the rebellion, as much so as is the soldier
who carries a rebel musket in the field; and it is as clearly the Pres
ident’s duty to suppress him as it is to suppress those in arms.
Bqtthe courts in the loyal states are open, it is urged, and there-?
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fore, why not do all this through them ? Because he cannot so surely
do it thus. The Constitution is imperative that he shall suppress such
men; and there is nothing in the Constitution that permits him to
evade it by leaving it to the hands of another department of the gov
ernment, which is independent of him. And, besides, the courts can
not do it efficiently. When the traitors of the loyal state of Maryland
were concocting their grand scheme to hurl the organized power of
that state against the government, probably not a man of them was
known to be guilty of any act for which he could even have been
arrested by civil process. And whatever their offences against the
laws might have been, and whatever the fidelity of the courts in that
jurisdiction, the process of civil law would have been far too slow to
prevent the consummation of the gigantic treason which would have
added another state to the rebellion.
And yet these men were
doing more to aid the rebel cause than ten thousand armed men in
the field could do. Courts could not have suppressed that unholy
work, but the summary imprisonment of those few men saved the
state of Maryland to the Union cause. And so in most other cases
of disloyal practices in the loyal states. Adroit traitors, in loyal
communities, can render more aid to the rebellion, without rendering
themselves liable to any civil law, than ten times their number in the
rebel army. That aid is none the less valuable to the enemy, or less
dangerous to the government, for not being violations of statute laws.
Statute books, and courts, and juries, cannot save the republic. The
rebellion is one indivisible whole, comprising all the rebels in the land,
North and South ; and the President is charged with the duty of sup
pressing all of it. And if he is to do it, he must do it by military
power—he must do it all by military power, for he cannot control
any other power.
Assuming, then, that the President has the constitutional right to
use any needful means to suppress rebellion, and, to this end, to use
the like means to suppress everything that aids it, it must be con
fessed, that here we stand at the threshold of despotism. Here is
the boundary line of our constitutional government, with a not very
distinct line of demarcation between it and despotic power. I think
I l ave made it plain that necessity is the only line. The President
may do, he must do, whatever is necessary to suppress the rebellion,
and preserve the life of the government. But who is the judge of the
necessity of any particular act ? If the President is the final judge,
there is virtually no limitation to his power in the premises, and we
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make him a despot. Undoubtedly he must judge in the first instance
—there is no alternative—-just as a man whose life is assailed, must
judge immediately what degree of force is necessary to repel
the attack and protect his own life. But it stands the President
in hand to judge wisely, just as it does the individual. The man
who kills his assailant unnecessarily, will not be held guiltless by a court
and jury, who are the final judges of the transaction. Exactly so
with the President. His government is assailed, and its life imper
illed by armed and unarmed traitors. The Constitution empowers
him to do everything that is necessary to suppress these traitors, all of
them, to the end that the life of the government may be saved—just
as the law empowers an individual to do everything necessary to sup
press an assassin to save his own life. But beyond this necessity, the
President has not an iota of power more than any other man. While
he may lawfully shoot down armed and resisting rebels, because they
cannot be otherwise suppressed, to take the lives of unarmed rebels in
the North, or of prisoners taken in arms, would be murder, because
their further aid to the rebellion can be suppressed by imprisonment.
To take their lives is, therefore, not necessary, and not constitutional.
And while he may lawfully suppress disloyal practices in the North,
by imprisoning their authors, because such is the mildest efficient
means to that end, and therefore necessary to the suppression of the
rebellion, the imprisonment of any other persons would be unconsti
tutional and false, and the President and every other person engaged
in it would be personally liable in law for the same. Such is the
constitutional theory upon which we are authorized to make war against
rebellion.
The President and his subordinates are, therefore, under a delicate
and terrible responsibility. While the Constitution requires him to
do anything and everything necessary to suppress all men who, in any
manner, or in any degree aid the rebellion, the courts will hold them
accountable for any acts beyond this; and Congress cannot relieve them
from this responsibility. To do so would be to authorize the violation
of the Constitution, and it is scarcely necessary to say that such an
act would be null and void. Inasmuch as the President has constitu
tional power to do all that is necessary to suppress rebellion, he needs
no protection from Congress for the exercise of this power ; and as
there is no power anywhere in the government to go beyond this, I
think it is self-evident that Congress cannot grant any power in the
premises ; and if it cannot do this, it cannot relieve the President or
anybody else from the legal consequences of a usurpation.
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Now, if I have succeeded in demonstrating that the Constitution
empowers the President to imprison persons by military power, to
suppress disloyal and dangerous practices, I think it clearly follows,
as a concomitant to this power, that he may suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, because the writ of habeas corpus is incon
sistent with that kind of imprisonment. For instance, in the case of
those Maryland prisoners to whom I have alluded ; they were arrested
and imprisoned by military authority, under the clearest necessity to
the public safety. Suppose they had been brought immediately before
a judge on a writ of habeas corpus. The judge would have inquired
simply into the legality of the imprisonment. If legal, they would
have been remanded to prison ; if not legal, they would have been
discharged. The civil courts are, as I have said, independent of the
President. They have no jurisdiction of military affairs, nothing to
do with the President’s work of suppressing rebellion. Their prov
ince is to administer the laws as they find them on the statute-books,
and nothing else ; so that with those men before Judge Taney, or any
other judge, on a writ of habeas corpus, without any charge of crime
regularly entered against them according to the civil code, they would
necessarily have been discharged, to pursue their work of treason, and
the President’s power in the premises would have been nugatory.
This independence of the judiciary, this antagonism, if you please,
between the civil and the military authorities, is what creates the
necessity for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus at
all.
This is why the suspension was not entirely prohibited in
the Constitution. Its sole object is to prevent the courts from par
alyzing the military arm of the government in times of public dan
ger. If the courts were bound to take cognizance of military neces
sities, and were competent to appreciate them, there would be no
need of a constitutional power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
at all. If Judge Hall, at New Orleans, could have administered the
law of military necessity, as General Jackson found it pressing upon
him, the general would have had no occasion to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus.
All this shows the suspension of the writ to be purely a military
prerogative. It is constitutionally permitted, only as a militaiy neces
sity—i. e., “ in cases of rebellion or invasion, when the public safety
may require itand none but the military authorities can know
when the public safety does require it.
The constitutional provision that “ the privilege of the writ of ha-
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beds corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion
or invasion, the public safety may require it,” is not a grant of the
power to suspend it, as superficial statesmen seem to suppose ; but
merely a limitation of the power, which it implies, is granted to some
body, in some other part of the Constitution. And the fact that this
limitation is found in the article devoted chiefly to the legislative de
partment, does not imply that the power is in Congress ; for the sec
tion in which it stands contains limitations and prohibitions clearly
applying to others as well as to Congress. The power in question
grows out of the constitutional facts that this is a government; that
it has a right to perpetuate itself, and that the power is a necessary
incident to the unlimited power to suppress rebellion, which is
committed to the hands of the President, as I have tried to eluci
date.
It may be added, furthermore, in respect to this whole matter, that
independently of the specific constitutional charge that is upon the
President to suppress rebellion, as I have tried to set it forth, his
constitutional appointment to be commander-in-chief of the army
and navy, without prescribing the powers of that office, invests him
with all the usual powers of a commander-in-chief, as recognized by
the usages of civilized nations. By this criterion, he is the supreme
ruler in all that appertains to the conduct of a war. His primary
business is to subdue the enemy, and his discretion in the use of the
means placed in his hands to that end, is limited only by the laws of
nations, and the Constitution as hereinbefore set forth. His com
mands 4n this behalf, limited as aforesaid, are the law of the land for
the time, and supercede whatever civil laws may be in conflict with
them ; for war—civil war especially—is an appeal above the civil laws,
and not the execution of them. This being so, it needs no argument
to prove that anything whatever, in any part of the country, that
tends to impede the progress of the national army in suppressing this
rebellion, by strengthening or encouraging the enemy, or otherwise,
directly or indirectly, may be lawfully suppressed by military au
thority.
Now, a word as to the clamor about despotism, and the danger of
the subversion of the Constitution and the people’s liberties. War
partakes very much .of the character of despotism, the best way we
can fix it; necessarily so, in the nature of things ; recognized to be
so by the laws of nations, and so accepted by our Constitution; so
that it is no subversion of the Constitution for a war to be carried on
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in the way that wars are always carried on, in the way that wars
'must be carried on, if they are wars at all; i. e., by power more or
less despotic. And, with the constitutional limitations and responsi
bilities, as hereinbefore stated, I think there is not the slightest dan
ger that these war powers will be permanently fixed in the ordinary
administration of the government. They are in the President’s hands
for iise upon disloyal persons, and nobody else ; they exist during tlie
war, and at no other time ; and for the purpose of suppressing the
rebellion, and for no other purpose. Can any man with professions
of loyalty to his government on his lips, object to this? Any objec
tions to it are objections to suppressing the rebellion at all.
Say ye that these are dangerous powers to concede to a President,
with a million or so of soldiers at his back ? No, the use of these
powers can, in any event, be dangerous only to the rebellion and the
rebels, for they reach not an inch beyond them. If, however, you
will have it that our liberties are just now7 endangered in this behalf,
the danger results not from the-existence or the exercise of these pow
ers to suppress the rebellion, but from the constitutional fact that the
President has command of the army of the nation, and the possibility
that he may overreach these powers, and thus rob us of .our liber
ties.
To a tyrant chieftain, however, with an invincible army
to do his bidding, it matters not where you draw the line of his law
ful powers. Draw it where you will, it will not retard his advance
to the goal of his ambition. But, after all, if you must insist that
our present proverbially honest and patriotic Chief Magistrate is bent
on the subversion of the liberties of his country, we have a certain
security in the army that he commands ; an army not of mercenaries
fighting for a master and for their bread, but an army made up of
our own citizens, a part of the great constituency of the Republic,
from every nook and corner of the land, our sons, our brothers, and
our neighbors, representing the sovereignty of the nation in the field ;
fighting, not for Abraham Lincoln, or for any other man, fighting, not
to destroy theii' own government and their own liberties, but fighting
only to crush out this rebellion, for the Constitution and the Union,
for their own liberties, as well as ours. In an army such as this we
have all the safety that a rebellion, such as this, admits of.
In conclusion, therefore, the Constitution is sufficient for any emer
gency of national danger. It invests the government with ample
power to preserve and perpetuate itself, without impairing the rights,
or endangering the liberies of the people. Let all the people of the
2
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loyal states sustain and defend it, in the only way in which it can
possibly be sustained and defended in such a time as this; i. e., by
aiding and encouraging, sustaining and supporting, the lawful agents
of the government, in striking down its confessed enemies. Then we
shall have no arbitrary arrests in loyal states ; then this rebellion will
speedily totter to its fall; then this Union will be established as upon
the rock of ages; then we may defy the machinations of all the des
potic powers of the Old World to impede our progress, or to cripple
our power; then our tree of liberty will take a deeper root, and send
its branches upward and outward until they encircle the whole earth.
Hyde Park, Pa., June, 1863.
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